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Abstract. The emergence of mobile devices with Internet connectivity (e.g., Wi-Fi) and global positioning capabilities (e.g., GPS) have triggered the widespread development of location-based applications. For instance, users are able to ask queries about points of interest in their proximity. Furthermore, users can act as mobile sensors to monitor traffic flow, or levels of air pollution. However, such
applications require users to disclose their locations, which raises serious privacy concerns. With
knowledge of user locations, a malicious attacker can infer sensitive information, such as alternative
lifestyles or political affiliations.
Preserving location privacy is an essential requirement towards the successful deployment of locationbased services (LBS). Currently, two main LBS use scenarios exist: in the first one, users send locationbased queries to an un-trusted server, and the privacy objective is to protect the location of the querying user. In the second setting, a trusted entity, such as a telephone company, gathers large amounts
of location data (i.e., trajectory traces) and wishes to publish them for data mining (e.g., alleviating
traffic congestion). In this case, it is crucial to prevent an adversary from associating trajectories to
user identities. In this survey paper, we give an overview of the state-of-the-art in location privacy
protection from the dual perspective of query privacy and trajectory anonymization. We review the
most prominent design choices and technical solutions, and highlight their relative strengths and
weaknesses.

1 Introduction
The increased popularity of mobile communication devices with embedded positioning capabilities (e.g., GPS) has generated unprecedented interest in the development of locationbased applications. Consider the following scenario: Bob uses his GPS enabled mobile
phone to ask the query “Find the nearest hospital to my present location”. This query can
be answered by a Location-Based Service (LBS) in a public server (e.g., Google Maps), which
maintains a database with points of interest (POI). However, the LBS is not trusted. To preserve his privacy, Bob does not contact the LBS directly. Instead he submits his query via
an intermediate trusted server which hides his ID (services for anonymous web surfing are
commonly available nowadays). However, the query still contains the exact coordinates
of Bob. One may reveal sensitive user data, such as religious affiliations or alternative
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lifestyles, by combining the location with other publicly available information (e.g., a telephone directory).
Another interesting class of applications is the study of trajectory traces. Consider a company that offers integrated payment services: for instance, the Octopus [1] payment system
deployed in Hong Kong enables users to pay for transportation and day-to-day purchases
with a single proximity card. As a result, a large amount of transaction logs which contain movement data are gathered. A third party company or government organization
may wish to access the data and derive trajectory patterns useful to optimize traffic flow.
The data owner is bounded by contractual obligations to guarantee user privacy. On the
other hand, releasing the data can provide significant revenues. The challenge is to publish
trajectories in a privacy-preserving fashion that still allows the derivation of meaningful
results (e.g., finding which road segments are most frequently subject to traffic jams).
The early work of Gruteser and Liu [12] identifies three aspects of location information
disclosure: position awareness, sporadic queries and location tracking. Position awareness refers to the case where a device monitors an individual’s location (e.g., an in-car
GPS system), but no data is released to another party. The user’s position is only used
locally, to navigate a map for instance, hence no privacy threat occurs. The sporadic (or
one-time) queries case refers to scenarios where a user reports his/her current location to
a service provider, in order to find nearby points-of-interest (e.g., “find the closest restaurant”). Lastly, location tracking occurs in applications that require frequent updates of the
user’s position, e.g., traffic monitoring. Note that, these disclosure scenarios do not always
occur separately. For instance, both sporadic and frequent location updates may arise in
the case of private LBS queries. If a user issues a continuous query, e.g., “report the location
of the closest restaurant while I move”, multiple locations (or a tentative trajectory) must
be sent to the service provider. On the other hand, the duration of location reporting may
be much shorter than in the case when an automobile acts as a mobile sensor and reports
its coordinates and velocity readings for the entire duration when the ignition is turned on.
Another important aspect in location disclosing is related to the attacker capabilities. In
[12], the authors discuss the concepts of weak and strong privacy. Weak privacy requires
that no sensitive data should be directly disclosed to a party that is not trusted. In other
words, if the current location of the user does not reveal any sensitive information, it is safe
to disclose. This requirement may be sufficient if an attacker only gains access to sporadic
location updates. On the other hand, if the attacker has access to a history of locations,
additional information can be inferred. For instance, if the trajectory of Bob includes along
its way a hospital building, the attacker may associate him with a medical condition, even
if Bob turns off his mobile device upon entering the hospital. In this case, strong privacy is
required. Strong privacy disallows the publication of location snapshots which, although
they do not represent a privacy violation by themselves, may be correlated to additional
data to infer the presence of a user at a privacy-sensitive position. Anonymizing trajectory
data is a representative example where strong privacy is necessary. Nevertheless, enforcing
strong privacy must not have a significant negative impact on data accuracy, in the sense
that the utility of the published data must be preserved.
In this paper, we provide a dual perspective on location privacy, by studying the two most
prominent location-based application scenarios: private location queries and anonymous
publication of trajectories. In Section 2, we outline the challenges that arise in protecting the
privacy of users who issue LBS queries. We provide a taxonomy of solutions that achieve
query privacy, and highlight their relative trade-offs with respect to privacy and performance. In Section 3, we survey methods that sanitize trajectory data before publication, in
order to prevent associations between users and sensitive locations. We review techniques
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that publish independent location samples, as well as those that release individual trajectories. In Section 4, we conclude and identify several open issues that represent interesting
directions for future research.

2 Private Location-Based Queries
To preserve privacy, the exact location of users that send queries to LBSs must not be disclosed. Instead, location data is first perturbed, or encrypted. For instance, some existing
techniques generate a few random fake locations and send a number of redundant queries
to the LBS [19, 28] to prevent user identification. Other methods employ the concept of kanonymity [24, 26], a well-established concept in the publication of microdata (e.g., hospital
records). In the LBS domain, spatial k-anonymity (SKA) is enforced by generating a Cloaking
Region (CR) which includes the query source as well as k − 1 other users [9, 11, 17, 22].
Finally, some techniques obscure the location data using spatial [18] or cryptographic [10]
transformations.
Achieving privacy incurs an additional overhead in processing queries: for instance, a
larger number of queries need to be processed in the case of techniques that generate redundant requests. For spatial k-anonymity techniques, query processing is performed with
respect to the CR, which is considerably more expensive than processing point queries.
Therefore, a trade-off emerges between privacy and performance.
We propose a taxonomy for LBS privacy techniques, consisting of three categories: (1)
two-tier spatial transformations, (2) three-tier spatial transformations and (3) cryptographic
transformations. Methods in Category 1 do not require any trusted third party, and the
query anonymization is performed by the mobile user itself. Category 2 assumes the presence of a trusted third-party anonymizer server, and offers better protection against background knowledge attacks (e.g., an attacker may have additional information on user locations, from an external source). Category 3 offers the strongest privacy guarantees, and
protects privacy even against powerful adversaries (e.g., attacker learns apriori all user
locations).

2.1 Category 1: Two-Tier Spatial Transformations
Methods in this category involve only two parties at query time: the user and the LBS
provider. Most of these methods1 assume that no background knowledge is available to the
attacker. A simple solution to query privacy is to generate a number of redundant queries
for each real query. For instance, user u could generate r random “fake” locations, and
send r redundant queries to the LBS, in addition to the actual query containing u’s location.
Such an approach is adopted in [19], where dummy locations are generated such that the
resulting trajectories mimic realistic movement patterns. Dummy-generation algorithms
can take into account movement parameters, such as velocity, and certain constraints, e.g.,
an underlying road network.
A more elaborate approach is SpaceTwist [28]: instead of generating a number of decoy
locations beforehand, it performs a multiple-round, incremental nearest-neighbor query
protocol, based on an anchor location. The anchor is initially set to a location randomly
generated by the user. Throughout the query protocol, the user maintains two subsets of
the dataspace: the demand and the supply spaces. The former consists of the space that needs
1A

notable exception is the PROBE [7] system which assumes that the attacker knows all sensitive locations
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Figure 1: Incremental NN search process in SpaceTwist

to be covered by the issued queries, in order to ensure that the correct result is returned
to the user, whereas the latter denotes the region of the space which is already covered.
The client (the terms user and client are utilized interchangeably) knows both the demand
space and the supply space, whereas the server knows only the supply space. Figure 1
gives an overview of query processing in SpaceTwist: initially, the demand space is set to
the domain space, and the supply space contains only the anchor location. As points are
retrieved from the server, the supply space expands. When a retrieved point is the closest
point to the client seen so far, the results are updated, and the demand space shrinks. When
the supply space eventually covers the demand space, it is termed final and the client is
guaranteed to know its exact nearest-neighbor.
The more recent work in [18] uses the Hilbert curve mapping [4] to transform the dataspace of points of interest. In a pre-processing (off-line) stage, a trusted entity transforms
each POI pi into its Hilbert value H(pi ), and uploads the values to the LBS. The parameters
of the transformations (e.g., curve orientation, scale, etc), are kept secret from the LBS, and
represent the encryption key. To allow encoding of queries and decoding of results, users
possess tamper-resistant devices that store the encryption key. At query time, the user u
computes its transformed location H(u) and requests from the LBS the closest data value
(in terms of 1D Hilbert values). Subsequently, the user decrypts the result by applying
the inverse mapping H −1 to obtain the actual POI. The privacy of the solution relies on the
large number of Hilbert curve parameter choices, and conjectures that it is computationally
infeasible for the malicious attacker to decrypt Hilbert values to actual POI. Nevertheless,
the above solution is approximate in nature and does not provide any guarantee on the
result accuracy.
The PROBE [7] system introduces a novel approach to location privacy, by preventing the
association between users and sensitive locations (similar to the ℓ − diversity [21] concept
from microdata anonymization). In PROBE, it is assumed that the attacker has access to
all sensitive locations from a particular data space (e.g., a city, a country, etc). Sensitive
locations are represented by features, which are classified into feature types (e.g., hospitals,
restaurants, etc). In an off-line phase, an obfuscated map is constructed, by partitioning the
space into a set of disjoint regions such that the probability of associating each region to a
certain feature type is bounded by a threshold. This process, called obfuscation, may require
an additional trusted third party, but in the on-line phase (i.e., at query time) PROBE is
a two-tier protocol. Figure 2 shows an obfuscated map with two obfuscated regions (OR1
and OR2 ): no region can be associated to the “hospital” feature type with probability higher
than 44% (OC1 contains 9 grid cells in total, 4 of which are sensitive, and 4/9 = 0.44).
PROBE offers an amount of privacy which is superior to the other methods in this cat-
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Figure 2: PROBE: Association Probability to “Hospital” Feature Type is Lower than 44%
egory. However, none of the two-tier spatial transformation solutions can prevent reidentification of the query source if an attacker has knowledge about specific user locations.
For instance, if user u situated in a remote location issues a query (i.e., an outlier case), an
attacker who knows that u is the only person residing in that area can associate u with the
query, breaching user privacy. The next category of query anonymization methods deals
with this issue.

2.2 Category 2: Three-Tier Spatial Transformations
Methods in this category implement the spatial k-anonymity paradigm: a cloaking region
that contains k − 1 users in addition to the query source (a k-CR) is generated, and the LBS
processes the query with respect to the CR. Since all the k locations enclosed by the CR
correspond to actual users (as opposed to “fake” locations in the previous category), the
probability to identify the query source is at most 1/k, even if the attacker has knowledge
about exact user locations.
Most solutions in this category employ the three-tier architecture illustrated in Figure 3.
A trusted centralized anonymizer acts as an intermediate tier between the users and the
LBS. All users subscribe to the anonymizer and continuously report their location while
they move. Each user sends his query to the anonymizer, which constructs the appropriate
CR and contacts the LBS. The LBS computes the answer based on the CR, instead of the
exact user location; thus, the response of the LBS is a superset of the answer. Finally, the
anonymizer filters the result from the LBS and returns the exact answer to the user.
In Casper [22], the anonymizer indexes the locations of the clients using a pyramid data
structure, similar to a Quad-tree. Assume u asks a query and let c be the lowest-level
cell of the Quad-tree where u lies. If c contains enough users (i.e., |c| ≥ k), c becomes
the CR. Otherwise, the horizontal ch and vertical cv neighbors of c are retrieved. If |c ∪
ch | ≥ k or |c ∪ cv | ≥ k, the corresponding union of cells becomes the CR; otherwise, the
anonymizer retrieves the parent of c and repeats this process recursively. Interval Cloak
[11] is similar to Casper in terms of both the data structure used by the anonymizer (a
Quad-tree), and the cloaking algorithm. The main difference is that Interval Cloak does
not consider neighboring cells at the same level when determining the CR, but ascends
directly to the ancestor level. Casper and Interval Cloak guarantee privacy only for uniform
distribution of user locations.
Hilbert Cloak [17] uses the Hilbert space filling curve to map the 2-D space into 1-D values.
These values are then indexed by an annotated B+ -tree. The algorithm partitions the 1-D
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Figure 3: Spatial k-anonymity: Three-tier Architecture
sorted list into groups of k users (the last group may have up to 2k − 1 users). For querying user u the algorithm finds the group to which u belongs, and returns the minimum
bounding rectangle of the group as the CR. The same CR is returned for any user in a given
group. Hilbert Cloak guarantees privacy for any distribution of user locations, but only for
one-time (i.e., single-snapshot) queries.
The previous approaches assume a static snapshot of user locations and do not consider
correlation attacks (e.g., history of user movement). In [6], correlation attacks are handled
as follows: At the initial timestamp t0 , cloaking region CR0 is generated, which encloses
a set AS of at least k users. At a subsequent timestamp ti , the algorithm computes a new
anonymizing region CRi that encloses the same users in AS, but contains their locations at
timestamp ti . There are two drawbacks: (i) As users move, the resulting CR may grow very
large, leading to prohibitive query cost. (ii) If a user in AS disconnects from the service, the
query must be dropped. Furthermore, in [6] it is assumed that there are no malicious users.
Methods in Category 2 rely on the presence of other users to achieve spatial k-anonymity.
These methods offer stronger privacy guarantees than Category 1 techniques, with the exception of PROBE. The privacy features of PROBE and spatial k-anonymity methods are
not directly comparable: PROBE does not achieve k-anonymity, but it does provide spatial
diversity. On the other hand, Category 2 techniques may not always prevent association
of users to sensitive locations. For instance, it is possible for an entire CR to fall within a
sensitive region (e.g., hospital). Therefore, the choice of paradigm (i.e., spatial anonymity
vs spatial diversity) ultimately depends on the specific application requirements.

2.3 Category 3: Cryptographic Transformations
Recently, a novel LBS privacy approach based on Private Information Retrieval (PIR) was introduced in [10]. Two such methods are proposed, which support approximate and exact
private nearest-neighbor search, respectively. PIR protocols [5, 20] allow a client to privately retrieve information from a database, without the database server learning what
particular information the client has requested. Most techniques are expressed in a theoretical setting, where the database is an n-bit binary string X (see Figure 4). The client
wants to find the value of the ith bit of X (i.e., Xi ). To preserve privacy, the client sends
an encrypted request q(i) to the server. The server responds with a value r(X, q(i)), which
allows the client to compute Xi .
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The work in [10] builds upon the computational PIR (cP IR) protocol for binary data introduced in [20]. cPIR employs cryptographic techniques, and relies on the fact that it is
computationally intractable for an attacker to find the value of i, given q(i). Furthermore,
the client can easily determine the value of Xi based on the server’s response r(X, q(i)).
Note that, PIR protocols for binary data can support index-based queries, i.e. they retrieve the element with a given index i, whereas LBS queries are content-based, e.g. “find
the closest POI to my location”. The challenge in applying PIR to LBS privacy consists of
finding effective methods to transform LBS queries into index-based queries. In [10] it is
shown how to compute privately the nearest POI to a user location with acceptable cost, by
retrieving a small fraction of the LBS’ database. Figure 5.a outlines an approximative protocol, where u is the querying user and the LBS contains four points of interest p1 , p2 , p3 , p4 .
In an off-line phase, the LBS generates a kd-tree index of the POIs and partitions the space
into three regions A, B, C. To answer a query, the server first sends to u the regions A, B, C.
The user finds the region (i.e., A) that contains him, and utilizes PIR to request all points
within A; therefore, the server does not know which region was retrieved. The user receives the POIs in A in encrypted form and calculates p4 as its NN. The method can be
used with a variety of spatial indices. Note that, the result is approximate, since the true
NN is p3 .
Figure 5.b outlines an exact NN protocol. In a pre-proces-sing phase, the server computes
the Voronoi diagram [8] for the POI set. Each POI pi is assigned to its Voronoi cell; by
definition, pi is the NN of any point within that cell. The server superimposes a regular
grid of arbitrary granularity on top of the Voronoi diagram. Each grid cell stores information about the Voronoi cells intersecting it. For example D1 stores {p4 }, whereas C3 stores
{p3 , p4 }. Upon asking a query, user u first retrieves the granularity of the grid, and calcuA
B
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1 p1
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Figure 5: Finding the Nearest Neighbor of u with PIR
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lates the grid cell that contains u (i.e., C2). Then, u employs PIR to request the contents of
C2. u receives {p3 , p4 } (encrypted) and calculates p3 as his exact NN.

2.4 The Privacy-Performance Trade-off
Supporting private LBS queries is achieved with an additional overhead in terms of computational and communication cost. The methods presented in this section provide various
trade-offs between privacy and performance. Both aspects of this trade-off are discussed
next.
2.4.1 The Privacy Aspect
Two-tier spatial transformations provide the least amount of privacy. For instance, dummygeneration offers no protection against attackers that possess background knowledge about
user locations. Furthermore, exact locations are disclosed to the LBS, which is undesirable, since an attacker can learn that one of these locations corresponds to the actual user.
SpaceTwist achieves slightly better privacy protection, because it does not disclose exact
user locations. Still, an attacker that has knowledge on the user distribution within the
supply space (see Section 2.1) could infer the identity of the query source.
PROBE offers the strongest privacy features among the methods in Category 1. It assumes that the attacker has knowledge on all sensitive feature locations, and prevents the
user-sensitive location association. In the worst case, however, an attacker may be able to
associate a user with a sensitive query, since an obfuscated region may contain no other
users in addition to the query source.
Methods in Category 2 (three-tier spatial transformations) do prevent user re-identification,
because cloaked regions contain at least k actual users. Still, a cloaking region can have reduced extent (in the worst case, it can degenerate to a point). Therefore, an attacker may
learn the whereabouts of the query source (and a number of k−1 other users), and associate
the locations of all users in the CR with a sensitive feature, compromising their privacy. No
direct comparison can be made between PROBE, which offers spatial diversity, and Category 2 methods that provide spatial anonymity. The choice of one method over another
depends on the privacy requirements of each specific scenario. Furthermore, none of the
Category 1 or 2 methods is able to protect user privacy for continuous queries (i.e., over
multiple snapshots of locations).
The PIR-based method in [10] provides full-featured privacy, under all attack models,
since no information about user location is disclosed. Therefore, no association between
users and sensitive locations can be performed. Even in the case when the attacker knows
the exact locations of all users (from an external source), the association between users and
queries is still prevented. The privacy guarantees hold for continuous queries (i.e., moving
users) as well.
2.4.2 The Performance Aspect
The main overhead incurred by the dummy-generation scheme consists of processing redundant queries. However, there is only one round of processing. SpaceTwist also requires
the processing of several point queries, but the process consists of multiple user-server
interaction rounds, which can lead to increased response time.
PROBE and spatial anonymity methods incur a similar overhead in terms of query processing: a region query is processed in each case (corresponding to either a cloaked, or
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Figure 6: Privacy-Performance Tradeoff in LBS Privacy
an obfuscated region). Depending on the particular application scenario (e.g., density of
sensitive locations and density of users), the relative performance of the two types of methods may vary. However, PROBE has the additional advantage that at query time, there
is no overhead associated to obfuscated region generation, which is done off-line. In contrast, spatial anonymity methods require on-line cloaked region generation and frequent
updates of user locations.
Finally, the PIR cryptographic-based approach in Category 3 may incur significant processing overhead, linear to the number of POI. As shown in [10], performance can be improved through a number of optimizations, such as re-using partial computation results,
and parallelization. Still, the overhead is likely to exceed that of spatial transformation
methods. Figure 6 shows a graphical representation of the discussed methods with respect
to the privacy-performance trade-off achieved.

3 Trajectory Anonymization
Figure 7 shows the typical scenario of trajectory anonymization: a central trusted component (e.g., telecom company) gathers location samples from a large number of subscribers.
The collected data is then shared with other un-trusted entities for various purposes, such
as traffic optimization research. The trusted entity is the data publisher, and must ensure
that releasing the data does not compromise user privacy. The publisher is assumed to be
bound by contractual obligations to protect the users’ interests, therefore it is trusted not
to allow privacy breaches to occur. Location collection is performed in an on-line fashion. Anonymization, on the other hand, is likely to be a more costly operation, and can be
performed off-line (although on-line anonymization is also possible).
When trajectory2 data is published, a malicious attacker may associate user identities to
sensitive locations, thus compromising users’ privacy. One straightforward solution to protect privacy is to remove all user identifiers from the data, or replace them with pseudoidentifiers. The work in [3] proposes the use of mix zones, i.e., areas with high user density
where many paths intersect. The idea is to confuse adversaries by inter-changing pseudoidentifiers among users within the mix zones. However, such an approach is not suffi2 We

use the terms trajectory and track interchangeably.

T RANSACTIONS

ON

D ATA P RIVACY 2 (2009)

12

Gabriel Ghinita

Figure 7: Trajectory Publication: System Architecture
cient against sophisticated adversaries who may possess background knowledge (e.g., address of a user’s residence) and may employ advanced target-tracking algorithms [23] to
re-construct trajectories from successive location samples.
Privacy-preserving trajectory publication techniques can be broadly classified into two
categories: methods that publish independent location samples, and methods that publish
individual trajectories. Techniques in the former class are suitable for applications where
only aggregate location data is required, e.g., traffic monitoring. Such methods are reviewed in Section 3.1. Solutions in the latter category publish individual trajectories, but
distort location samples at each timestamp. These methods are reviewed in Section 3.2, and
are suitable for applications where the causality relationship between source and destination locations is important.

3.1 Publishing Independent Location Samples
The early work of [12] proposes three algorithms to prevent disclosure of sensitive location
data. All three assume the existence of a map with the sensitive locations in the enclosing geographical region. The first solution, called base, simply suppresses from publication those updates corresponding to sensitive locations. This method achieves only weak
privacy. The second solution, called bounded-rate, aims to achieve strong privacy by suppressing with fixed frequency updates in non-sensitive areas (in addition to withholding
sensitive locations). The idea is to filter out some of the non-sensitive locations that may
represent entry points to sensitive areas. Finally, the third method, called k-area, splits the
map into zones, or cells, that have both sensitive and non-sensitive locations. All updates in
a given cell are delayed until the user exits that particular cell. Subsequently, the previous
cell locations are disclosed only if the user had not visited any sensitive location in that cell.
None of these three solutions protects against an attacker with background knowledge.
Later in [14], the same authors show that multiple-hypotheses tracking algorithms (MTT)
[23] based on Kalman filters are very successful in re-constructing trajectories (in some
cases, by matching close to 100% of location samples to the correct path). Once the trajectories are re-constructed, they can be mapped to user identities, based on a small number of
known samples (e.g., a user’s home or office). In addition, the success probability of identifying tracks and matching users to tracks increases with the duration of track acquisition.
Figure 8(a) shows an example with two user trajectories A : a1 − a2 − a3 and B : b1 − b2 − b3 .
Even if user identifiers are suppressed, and location samples are independently published
for each timestamp (i.e., as pairs (a1 , b1 ) · · · (a3 , b3 )), filtering allows an attacker to assign
sample a3 to track A with 90% probability. To confuse the attacker, individual location
samples are distorted, in order to minimize the probability of successfully matching loca-
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Figure 8: Path Perturbation Prevents Trajectory Re-Construction
tions to trajectories. For instance, in Figure 8(b), the locations of samples a3 and b3 are
changed to a′3 and b′3 , respectively. The attacker assigns location a′3 to track B with high
probability (0.8). Therefore, track matching for the third timestamp (and likely subsequent
timestamps as well) is prevented.
Distorting location samples inherently introduces data inaccuracy, and may impact correct
query processing on top of the data. A trade-off among privacy and accuracy emerges.
The authors of [14] propose metrics to quantify both privacy and inaccuracy. Specifically,
privacy is measured by the expectation of distance error, which captures how accurate an
adversary can match locations to tracks. Given N users (hence N location samples at each
timestamp) and an observation time of M timestamps, expectation of distance error for
trajectory of user u is measured as
E[u] =

M Ii
1 XX
pj (i)dj (i)
N M i=1 j=1

where Ii is the total number of assignment hypotheses for user u at timestamp i, pj (i) is the
probability associated with hypothesis j at timestamp i, and dj (i) is the distance between
the actual and estimated position of u at timestamp i. The data accuracy is measured according to the quality of service (QoS) metric
QoS =

N M
1 XXq
(xui (j) − x′ui (j))2 + (yui (j) − yu′ i (j))2
N M i=1 j=1

where (xui , yui ) and (x′ui , yu′ i ) are the actual and perturbed coordinates of ui , respectively.
The data undergo a Path Perturbation phase, which formulates the problem of confusing
the attacker as a constrained non-linear optimization problem. The objective is to maximize
the privacy function E under the constraint that the maximum distortion for each individual published location does not exceed a threshold R, which is application-dependent. The
perturbation phase needs to consider all permutations of assigning location samples to
tracks, hence the computational cost is very high. For instance to perform perturbation for
N user trajectories of M samples each, the complexity is O(N !)M , which is not feasible in
practice. To decrease the overhead, a Path Segmentation phase is performed prior to perturbation. The idea is to reduce the search space for the constraint optimization problem by
pruning some of the most unlikely hypotheses of assigning samples to tracks.
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The Path Perturbation algorithm maximizes the privacy metric under the given accuracy
constraint R. However, this is not sufficient to protect the privacy of users in sparse areas. If user trajectories are situated far apart from each other, even the best achievable
expectation of distance error may not be enough to prevent re-identification. The work in
[16] acknowledges this limitation and proposes a solution that relies on the k-anonymity
concept. However, the authors observe that simple location cloaking, as used for private
queries, is not suitable for publishing trajectory data, because it severely distorts data. In
traffic monitoring applications, for instance, in order to match a user location to a road
segment with high probability, the spatial accuracy must be within 100m. It is shown experimentally that k-anonymization based spatial cloaking fails to achieve this threshold:
for instance, with a real trajectory trace and a relatively low anonymity degree (k = 3), the
obtained accuracy is 500m.
In practice, the privacy threat occurs when individual trajectories can be associated with
particular users. Furthermore, such association can not be performed in very dense areas,
but only in sparse areas, and the attacker’s success probability increases with the length
of the disclosed trajectory. Based on these observations, the work in [16] introduces two
new privacy metrics. The first one is called Time-to-Confusion (TTC), and measures the
maximum number of consecutive timestamps for which locations along the same trajectory
are safe to disclose. If TTC is exceeded for a certain track, its subsequent location samples
are suppressed, to prevent trajectory re-construction. The second metric used is tracking
uncertainty, which measures for each user u the entropy
H(u) = −

X

pi log pi

i

where pi is the probability of associating u to the location sample i in a particular snapshot.
The attacker’s confidence is 1 − H. An algorithm is proposed which verifies at each timestamp if the TTC and the attacker’s confidence are below certain thresholds. If thresholds
are exceeded, the corresponding location samples are suppressed. The work in [15] follows
a similar approach, and extends the solution in [16] by allowing location updates only at
well-specified points along a Virtual Trip Line (VTL). The points along each VTL are chosen
in such a manner that they correspond to privacy-insensitive locations only.

3.2 Publishing Individual Trajectories
The objective of the techniques presented in the previous section is to prevent an attacker
from re-constructing trajectories based on independent locations. Publishing independent
location samples is useful for applications that require only aggregate information, such
as traffic monitoring. However, in other classes of applications, the movement patterns
and the causality relationship between certain source and destination locations may be of
interest. In such cases, it is necessary to publish in a privacy-preserving manner entire trajectories, rather than independent location samples. Preventing a malicious adversary from
correlating location samples is no longer a challenge. Instead, the focus is on perturbing
trajectory data to prevent the association of individuals with trajectories.
The work in [27] considers a scenario where location samples are drawn from a discrete
set (e.g., retail points, tourist attractions, etc.), and assumes an attack model with clearlydefined background knowledge. Specifically, the attacker already knows some trajectory
fragments, and the identity of users corresponding to those fragments. Consider the example of a company P (publisher) that commercializes cards as a convenient form of payment.
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Figure 9: Protecting against Attackers that Know Trajectory Sub-Sequences
Such cards can be used to pay for transportation, as well as for day-to-day purchases. In
time, P (which is trusted by all card users) will gather large amounts of trajectory data,
which can be useful for a variety of purposes (e.g., inferring consumer travel and spending
patterns). However, P is required by law not to compromise the privacy of its customers.
Furthermore, the partner companies of P are not trusted. For example, a retail chain company A has access to all purchases by user u, and also learns the identity of u through a
customer-fidelity program. Thus, A has access to a sub-set of the trajectories followed by
u, and may wish to find out what other locations u has visited. P must prevent against this
sort of privacy threat.
Consider the example of Figure 9, where P publishes the original location data. Partner
companies A and B have knowledge about subsets of trajectories corresponding to their
points of operation. Such known locations are denoted by ai and bj , respectively. A may
try to infer the other locations that its customers have visited, by inspecting the original
data. For instance, A can identify that u1 corresponds to trajectory t1 , since only t1 matches
the a1 − a2 − a3 movement pattern known by A. Therefore, A can infer with certainty that u
has visited location b1 , which may correspond to a nightclub. Such a sensitive association
is clearly a privacy breach. The fact that allowed the staging of a successful attack was A’s
ability to identify the trajectory of u1 . This situation is similar to that of publishing microdata, such as hospital records [24, 26]. In trajectory publication, the location data known
to the attacker (A’s view) is used as a quasi-identifier, whereas the location samples corresponding to other companies (e.g., B) are sensitive attributes. The authors of [27] approach
the trajectory anonymization problem from a data mining [13] perspective. Specifically,
each trajectory is regarded as a transaction, and each location sample represents a transaction item, according to data mining terminology. A particular itemset that is present in the
attacker’s database can be used as a quasi-identifier. To prevent re-identification of trajectories, the published data must consist of transactions in which every itemset occurs a
sufficient number of times. In other words, the support [13] of each itemset must be large
enough to ensure that the privacy breach probability Pbr is below a threshold. Privacy
breach is quantified as the probability of associating an individual trajectory with a particular sensitive location/item, e.g., b1 in the earlier example. Before publication, the data is
sanitized through a greedy heuristic that suppresses individual location samples. In Figure 9, the value a3 is removed from the original data. As a result, A can only infer that the
trajectory of u1 is other t′1 or t2 . Therefore, u1 may have visited either b1 or b2 with equal
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Figure 10: Anonymizing Trajectories through Space Translation
likelihood, hence the breach probability is reduced from 100% to 50%. The inherent inaccuracy in removing samples is measured by the path deviation introduced. In our example,
by removing a3 , the obtained deviation is dist(t1 , t′1 ) = d.
The work in [2] also employs the concept of k-anonymity for trajectories. However, as
opposed to [27], it considers continuous-space location samples. Privacy is mainly enforced through location generalization, rather than suppression as in the case of [27]. The
privacy paradigm proposed by [2] is (k, δ)-anonymity, which is achieved using the concept
of anonymizing tubes, i.e., a sequence of cylindrical volumes that spatially enclose user trajectories. Figure 10 shows an example of k = 2 co-located trajectories, i.e., trajectories that
can be enclosed by a tube with radius δ. It is considered that trajectories are defined over
the same discrete time domain [t1 · · · tn ], and ∀t ∈ [t1 · · · tn ] and any two trajectories τ1 , τ2
inside an anonymized tube, it holds that
dist((τ1 [t].x, τ1 [t].y)(τ2 [t].x, τ2 [t].y)) ≤ δ
where τ [t].x and τ [t].y represent the coordinates of the location sample along trajectory τ
at time t.
For each group of trajectories, the polygonal line that represents the center of the tube
is published. The data distortion is measured by summing over all timestamps the distance between the location sample of each trajectory and the cylinder center at that particular timestamp. Anonymization is performed through a two-step algorithm. First, a
pre-processing phase is employed, to horizontally partition the set of trajectories according
to their timeframes (i.e., obtain disjoint sets of trajectories that are concomitant). Next, a
greedy clustering heuristic is performed within each partition, to obtain groups of at least
k trajectories each. The tube that encloses each group is published.
In [25], trajectory privacy is also achieved by employing k-anonymity. However, as opposed to [2], trajectories from distinct timeframes can be anonymized together, and their
time difference is factored in the data inaccuracy metric used. An algorithm for trajectory
clustering in the three-dimensional space-time domain is proposed, which creates groups
of at least k transactions each. Trajectories belonging to the same group are generalized,
such that they are indistinguishable from each other. Grouping involves generalization of
both spatial and temporal coordinates, i.e., all trajectories in the same group are replaced
with their spatio-temporal bounding box. An example of anonymizing two trajectories, tr1
and tr2 , is shown in Figure 11. Each location sample is tagged with the timestamp at which
it was collected. The resulting bounding boxes together with their time differences (i.e.,
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Figure 11: Anonymizing Trajectories through Spatio-Temporal Generalization
the time period covered by each bounding box) incur information loss, which is measured
according to a log-cost metric (LCM). LCM quantifies the trajectory inaccuracy in both space
and time, and is calculated by summing the enlargement required over each of the M published snapshots of locations. A weighting factor for space (ws ), as well as time (wt ) can be
specified, depending on the application that uses the data. Formally,
LCM =

M
X

[ws (log |xi | + log |yi |) + wt log |ti |]

i=1

Anonymization of trajectories is performed in two stages. First, the algorithm chooses
the trajectories that will belong to each group. This phase is performed through an heuristic that is similar to string matching. Next, an anonymization phase is performed, where
it is decided which samples from each trajectory will be anonymized with samples from
other trajectories. Note that, not all trajectories have the same number of samples. Furthermore, not all location samples must be retained: for instance, in Figure 11, the sample with
timestamp t7 from tr2 is suppressed.

4 Conclusions
Location privacy has already been acknowledged as an important problem, and effective
privacy-preserving solutions will be necessary to support the widespread development
and adoption of location-based applications. The current survey paper identified two main
facets of location privacy, and overviewed the state-of-the-art in private location queries
and anonymous trajectory publication.
For the private queries domain, we have proposed a taxonomy of anonymization techniques and highlighted their relative privacy-performance trade-offs. At one end of the
spectrum, methods such as SpaceTwist and dummy-generation schemes incur low overhead, but they only provide privacy under a limited set of assumptions (i.e., attacker has
no background knowledge). At the opposite end, the PIR approach from [10] offers strong
privacy even in highly-adversarial scenarios. Finally, the spatial anonymity (Category 2)
and spatial diversity (PROBE) techniques manage to provide a good amount of privacy
under reasonable attack assumptions, and incur moderate overhead.
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The research area of privacy-preserving trajectory publication is currently fractured between two different paradigms: releasing independent location samples versus publishing
entire trajectories. The advocates of the former approach claim that generalization and suppression of data, which is inherent if individual trajectories are published, cannot achieve
the level of accuracy dictated by practical applications. On the other hand, publication of
independent samples may not be sufficient if complex tasks (e.g., deriving travel patterns)
are performed on top of the data.
There are several interesting open directions for location privacy research. For the private
queries problem, it is interesting to study combined methods that achieve both anonymity
and diversity (i.e., they prevent both user-sensitive location and user-sensitive query associations). For instance, the obfuscation map construction of PROBE could be augmented
with an on-line component that verifies that sufficient users are included in an obfuscated
region. Another promising direction is to develop PIR-based techniques that support more
complex types of queries. It is also worth investigating methods that can further reduce
the overhead of PIR. One possible approach would be to design a hybrid method that combines spatial transformations (at a coarser level of data space granularity), followed by a
PIR phase on a restricted portion of the data space.
For trajectory publication, it would be interesting to study if location privacy can be
achieved independently of a centralized trusted entity. Storing all location data in one place
may represent a privacy threat in itself, if the centralized publisher is compromised. A
more suitable approach may have users anonymize their tracks in a collaborative manner.
Finally, it may be interesting to find whether cryptographic techniques could be applied
to trajectory anonymization as well. In this setting, query processing could be performed
directly on the encrypted data, and the assumption of an intermediate trusted entity can be
relinquished.
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